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ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIA IN A COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY
MATTHEW HENDTLASS AND NAZAR MIHEISI
Abstract. This paper gives a constructive treatment of McKenzie’s theorem on the existence of
general equilibria. While the full theorem does not admit a constructive proof, and hence does not admit
a computational realisation, we show that if we strengthen the conditions on our preference relation—we
require  to be uniformly rotund in the sense of Bridges [5]—then we can find ‘approximate equilibrium
points,’ points at which the collective profit may not be maximal, but can be made arbitrarily close to
being maximal.
1. Introduction
In a series of papers [3, 4, 5, 7] Bridges gave a development of the theory of utility functions in
constructive mathematics. In this paper we extend on these beginnings to a rigorously construc-
tive development of mathematical economics. We consider the existence (explicit construction) of
general equilibria in a competitive economy: Does there exist an algorithm to construct a competi-
tive equilibrium (under economically reasonable conditions)? Since the construction of competitive
equilibria seems to require Brouwer’s fixed point theorem—which is not constructively valid—the
answer would appear to be no. We satisfy ourselves with the construction of price vectors which
are almost equilibria.
We begin by giving a review of (Bishop’s) constructive mathematics, the system in which this paper
is written. Fundamentally, constructive mathematics differs from standard ‘classical’ mathematics
in the interpretation of the phrase ‘there exists’. Classically an object is asserted to exist if its failure
to exist is contradictory; constructively we demand more: an object can be asserted to exist only if
we can give a procedure which allows the construction of approximations, of arbitrary accuracy, in
a finite time—dependent on the desired accuracy—with finite computational resources. Formally,
constructive mathematics is essentially mathematics with intuitionistic logic and dependent choice1.
Adding the law of excluded middle
LEM: For each proposition P , either P holds or ¬P holds.
to constructive mathematics returns classical mathematics (with dependent choice, rather than the
full axiom of choice). Working with intuitionistic logic ensures that proofs proceed in a manner
which preserves computational content: a proof of A⇒ B converts a witness of A into a witness of
B. In particular, a constructive proof of ∃xP (x) embodies an algorithm for the construction of an
object x, and an algorithm verifying that P (x) holds. In this manner, constructive mathematics
can be viewed as a high level programming language. One should note, however, that the con-
structive mathematician is interested only in what is within the realms of computability and not
with computational efficiency. On the other hand, there have been (successful) efforts to extract
efficient algorithms from constructive proofs [18].
We hope a (vague) example will illuminate the necessary mindset of the constructive mathematician,
and the rewards for his or her hard work. The intermediate value theorem says that for every
1For an introduction to the practice of constructive mathematics see [2, 8, 10]; formally we view constructive
mathematics as constructive ZF set theory [1] plus dependent choice, with intuitionistic logic
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2 HENDTLASS AND MIHEISI
uniformly continuous function f : [0, 1] → R with f(0) = −1 and f(1) = 1, there exists x ∈ [0, 1]
such that f(x) = 0. The classical argument is simple: define
x = sup{y ∈ [0, 1] : f(y) < 0},
then f(x) = 0 by continuity. This proof, however, gives us no idea of the value of x unless we can
calculate this supremum, which we generally cannot.
Constructively, we must be more careful; indeed, it is in general not possible to construct such an
x, but we can construct approximate zeros: for all ε > 0 there exists x ∈ [0, 1] such that |f(x)| 6 ε.
Here is such a construction. Fix ε and let n ∈ N be such that for all s, t ∈ [0, 1], if |s − t| 6 1/n,
then |f(x) − f(y)| < ε/2; we consider the set S = {0, 1/n, . . . , 1}. We cannot generally decide
whether f(x) < 0 ∨ f(x) = 0 ∨ f(x) > 0 for each x ∈ S: we might check the first million digits of
f(x) before giving up and deciding it is probably zero, while the one millionth and first digit shows
it to be positive (or negative)—to show f(x) is zero requires checking infinitely many digits. By
checking enough digits we can, however, decide f(x) < 0 ∨ |f(x)| < ε ∨ f(x) > 0.
If for any element of S we decide that |f(x)| < ε, then we are done. If, on the other hand, we have
that f(x) < 0 or f(x) > 0 for each x ∈ S, then there must be some m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1} such that
f(m/n) < 0 and f((m + 1)/n) > 0. That max{|f(m/n)|, |f((m + 1)/n)|} > ε would contradict
our choice of n; whence both |f(m/n)| and |f((m+ 1)/n)| are less than ε, and in this case we are
also done. This argument, which is essentially the one dimensional case of Scarf’s algorithm for
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem [17], actually produces for us an approximate zero of the desired
accuracy.
We now turn our attention to competitive equilibria.
We work in the economic model used by McKenzie [13, 14]; we have N commodities, n producers,
and m consumers. To each producer we associate a production set Yi ⊂ RN ; and to each consumer
a consumption set Xi ⊂ RN endowed with a preference relation <i. Further we assume that each
consumer has no initial endowment, and we write x∼ix′ for x i x′ ∨ x′ i x and x i x′ for
x <i x′ ∧ x 6 ∼ix′. When the price p ∈ RN prevails, we define:
I the budget set for consumer i
βi(p) = {xi ∈ Xi : p · xi 6 0} ;
I the p upper contour set of consumer i
Ci(p) = {xi ∈ Xi : xi < ξ for all ξ ∈ βi(p)} ;
I consumer i’s demand set
Di(p) = βi(p) ∩ Ci(p).
In order to prove meaningful results we must restrict our attention to consumers who act in a
suitably reasonable manner; the following restrictions on < give some measures of the reasonable
consumer. Let  be a preference relation on a subset X of RN .
I  is a continuous preference relation if the graph
{(x, x′) : x  x′}
of < is open.
I  is strictly convex if X is convex and tx+ (1− t)x′  x′ whenever x < x′, x 6= x′, and
t ∈ (0, 1).
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I X is uniformly rotund if for each ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that for all x, x′ ∈ X, if
‖x− x′‖ > ε, then {
1
2
(
x+ x′
)
+ z : z ∈ B(0, δ)
}
⊂ X,
where B(x, r) is the open ball of radius r centred on x. The preference relation  is
uniformly rotund if X is uniformly rotund and for each ε > 0 there exists δ > 0 such
that if ‖x − x′‖ > ε (x, x′ ∈ X), then for each z ∈ B(0, δ) either 12 (x+ x′) + z  x or
1
2 (x+ x
′) + z  x′.
Bridges showed in [6] that a uniformly rotund preference relation is strictly convex.
A set S is said to be inhabited if there exists x such that x ∈ S. An inhabited subset S of a
metric space X is located if for each x ∈ X the distance
ρ (x, S) = inf {ρ(x, s) : s ∈ S}
from x to S exists. An ε-approximation to S is a subset T of S such that for each s ∈ S, there
exists t ∈ T such that ρ(s, t) < ε. We say that S is totally bounded if for each ε > 0 there
exists a finitely enumerable ε-approximation to S. If each bounded subset of S is contained in a
totally bounded subset of S, then S is said to be locally totally bounded. A metric space X is
compact if it is both complete and totally bounded.
In [5] Bridges gave a constructive proof of the following theorem (see also [12]).
Theorem 1. Let  be a uniformly rotund preference relation on a compact subset X of RN , let P
be a bounded set of nonzero vectors in RN such that for each p ∈ P ,
(i) β(p) is inhabited;
(ii) there exists ξ ∈ X such that ξ  x for all x ∈ β(p).
Then D(p) consists of a unique point F (p), the function F is uniformly continuous, and p ·F (p) =
0.
The function F constructed in Theorem 1 is called the demand function of (X,<). Classically,
we only require  to be strictly convex and continuous in order to prove the existence of a demand
function [19].
A competitive equilibrium of an economy consists of a price vector p ∈ RN , points ξ1, . . . , ξi ∈
RN , and a vector η in the aggregate production set
Y = Y1 + · · ·+ Yn,
satisfying
E1 ξi ∈ Di(p) for each 1 6 i 6 m.
E2 p · y 6 p · η = 0 for all y ∈ Y .
E3
∑m
i=1 ξi = η.
An economy is said to have approximate competitive equilibria if for all ε > 0 there exist a
price vector p ∈ RN , points ξ1, . . . , ξi ∈ RN , and a vector η satisfying E1,E3, and
AE p · η > −ε and p · y 6 0 for each y ∈ Y .
Alternatively, an economy has approximate equilibria if
inf{p · (ξ1, . . . , ξm) : ξi ∈ Di(p) for each 1 6 i 6 m} = 0.
In an approximate equilibrium each consumer maximises his utility while, in contrast, each firm
only approximately maximises its profits. Why not demand that profit is maximised, and allow
consumers utility to deviate from the optimal? There are a few reasons why the above definition
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gives the appropriate notion of approximate equilibrium in the context of constructive mathematics.
Our task is to construct a price vector p satisfying our equilibrium condition, for once this is done
the ξi are given by Theorem 1. Thus it is E2 which requires the construction of a fixed point,
and hence is not possible constructively. So we are forced, at an approximate equilibrium, to allow
firms to make losses; however, these losses can be made arbitrarily small, and a loss of one millionth
of a cent, for instance, is no loss at all. Anyway, in a real economy things are sold in units—we
deal with discrete set of consumer bundles—and we are not in general able to maximise profit, or
consumer utility.
Let Fi denote the demand function on (Xi,<i). A subset Y of a normed space is said to be a
convex cone if λy ∈ Y and y+ y′ ∈ Y whenever y, y′ ∈ Y and λ > 0. The convex conic closure
cone(Y ) of Y is the smallest convex cone containing Y ; that is,
cone(S) = {r(tx+ (1− t)y) : r > 0, t ∈ [0, 1], x, y ∈ S}.
We use S◦ to denote the interior of a subset S of a metric space.
We can now state McKenzie’s theorem on the existence of competitive equilibria.
McKenzie’s Theorem
Suppose that
(i) each Xi is compact and convex;
(ii) each <i is continuous and strictly convex;
(iii) (Xi ∩ Y )◦ is nonempty for each i;
(iv) Y is a closed convex cone;
(v) Y ∩ {(x1, . . . , xN ) : xi > 0 for each i} = {0}; and
(vi) for each p ∈ RN and each i, if ∑mi=1 Fi(p) ∈ Y , then there exists xi ∈ Xi such
that xi i Fi(p).
Then there exists a competitive equilibrium.
The standard proofs of McKenzie’s theorem on the existence of general equilibria all contain seem-
ingly necessary applications of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem (often in the guise of Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem). Since the construction of exact fixed points is not possible—even with strong
assumptions on the function, like the uniqueness of any fixed point [16, 20]—it seems unlikely that a
constructive proof of the existence of exact competitive equilibria is possible under any economically
reasonable assumptions.
It may seem that given Bridges constructive proof of Theorem 1 and Scarf’s algorithm for finding
approximate fixed points [17], that all the hard work for giving a computational version of McKen-
zie’s theorem has already been done. This is not the case: much care and attention must be given
to the construction of the, family, of set valued mappings to which we will apply Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem.
2. Constructing competitive equilibria
Our constructive version of McKenzie’s theorem is the following.
Theorem 2. Suppose that
(i) each Xi is compact and convex;
(ii) each <i is continuous and uniformly rotund;
(iii) (Xi ∩ Y )◦ is inhabited for each i;
(iv) Y is a located closed convex cone;
(v) Y ∩ {(x1, . . . , xN ) : xi > 0 for each i} = {0}; and
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(vi) for each p ∈ RN and each i, if ∑mi=1 Fi(p) ∈ Y , then there exists xi ∈ Xi such that
xi i Fi(p).
Then there are approximate competitive equilibria.
Our proof follows the standard classical proof via Kakutani’s fixed point theorem (see [15]) as
closely as possible; typical of constructive mathematics, it has a distinctly geometric character.
The polar of a subset S of RN is the set
Spol =
{
p ∈ RN : p · x 6 0 for all x ∈ S} .
It follows directly from the definition that two sets S, T ⊂ RN have the same polar if and only if
they have the same convex conic closure. Classically, a little further work shows that
(*) the polar of the polar of a set is equal to its convex conic closure,
but this is not the case in our intuitionistic setting as the following ‘Brouwerian counterexample2’
shows.
Given a proposition P , let S be the set
S = {(0, 1)} ∪ {x : x = (1/2, 0) ∧ P} ∪ {x : x = (1, 0) ∧ ¬P}.
Then (1, 1) ∈ (Spol)pol. Suppose that (1, 1) ∈ cone(S); that is, suppose there exist r > 0, t ∈ [0, 1],
and x, y ∈ S such that
(1, 1) = r(tx+ (1− t)y).
Without loss of generality, we may suppose x = (0, 1). Then either r > 2, in which case y must
be (1/2, 0) and so P holds, or r < 3 and, similarly, ¬P must hold. Hence (*) implies the law of
excluded middle.
The above counterexample is rather contrived and seems to have little to do with real mathematics
or economics, but seems merely to indicate how one would show (*) to be independent of some
formalisation of constructive mathematics. It is, however, relevant: since our framework encapsu-
lates what is computable in a strict, though ill-defined, way, this example shows that we cannot
compute the information implicit in “x ∈ cone(S)”—that there exists r > 0, t ∈ [0, 1], y, y′ ∈ S
such that x = r(ty + (1− t)y′)—given only the information that for all z, if z · p 6 0 for all p ∈ S,
then x · z = 0. Succinctly, belonging to the conic closure of a set gives more computational infor-
mation than belonging to the polar of the polar of that set, and when it comes to computational
information we cannot get something for nothing!
The above failure of (*) results from us having a poor handle on the set S. The sets we deal with
in practice are generally more well behaved, and (*) can be proved, constructively, for a large class
of sets. The following result meets our needs.
Proposition 3. Let S be a located closed convex cone in RN . Then the polar of the polar of S
equals S.
Proof. By definition x ∈ (Spol)pol if and only if⋂
s∈S
{z ∈ RN : z · s 6 0} = Spol ⊂ {x}pol.
The assumption that ρ(x, S) > 0 would contradict the above equation: let y be the closest point to x
in S, this exists by Theorem 6 of [9]. Since S is a closed convex cone, y−x ∈ Spol, but x−y /∈ {x}pol.
Hence ρ(x, S) = 0, and, since S is closed, x ∈ S. The converse is straightforward. 
2A Brouwerian counterexample is a weak counterexample: it is not an example contradicting a proposition, but
an example showing a proposition to imply a principle which is unacceptable in constructive mathematics. Generally
these can be considered as independence proofs.
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For each i we fix ξi ∈ (Xi ∩ Y )◦ and let ξ =
∑m
i=1 ξi; without loss of generality, each term of ξ is
nonzero. The proof of Theorem 2 proceeds by an application of a constructively valid version of
Kakutani’s fixed point theorem to the set
P =
{
p ∈ Y pol : p · ξ = −1
}
of normalised price vectors. First, however, we require a number of lemmas. For the remainder of
the paper we assume that the hypothesis of Theorem 2 hold. We denote by B(x, r) and B(x, r)
the open and closed balls, respectively, centred on x with radius r.
Lemma 4. If y ∈ Y ◦, then p·y < 0 for all nonzero p ∈ Y pol. Moreover, sup{p·y : p ∈ Y pol, ‖p‖ =
1} < 0.
Proof. Let p be a nonzero element of Y pol; pick 1 6 i 6 N such that pi 6= 0, and fix r > 0 such
that B(y, r) ⊂ Y . Then
y′ ≡ y + (sign(pi)r)ei ∈ Y,
where ei is the ith basis vector. Hence
p · y < p · y + |rpi| = p · y′ 6 0.
If ‖p‖ = 1, then we may suppose that |pi| > 1/2
√
N ; thus p · y < −|rpi| < −r/2
√
N . 
Let S be a subset of a metric space X. The complement of S is
∼S = {x ∈ X : x 6= s for all s ∈ S}.
If S is located, then the apartness complement of S is the set
−S = {x ∈ X : ρ(x, S) > 0}.
Lemma 5. For each i the demand function Fi for Xi maps into ∼(Y ◦).
Proof. Suppose that F (p) ∈ Y ◦. Then, by Lemma 4, p · F (p) < 0, which contradicts Theorem
1. 
Let C be a located convex subset of a Banach space X. Then for each ξ ∈ C◦ and each z ∈ −C
there exists a unique point h(ξ, z) in the intersection of the interval
[ξ, z] = {tξ + (1− t)z : t ∈ [0, 1]}
and the boundary ∂C of C; moreover, the mapping (ξ, z) 7→ h(ξ, z)—the boundary crossing
map of C—is pointwise continuous on C◦ × −C [10, Proposition 5.1.5]. The next lemma shows
that for a fixed ξ ∈ C◦, this mapping is uniformly continuous.
Lemma 6. Let X be a bounded convex subset of RN and let ξ ∈ X◦. Then the function h : RN → X
which fixes each point of X and sends y ∈ ∼X to the unique intersection point of [ξ, y] and ∂X is
uniformly continuous.
Proof. Without loss of generality we suppose ξ = 0. Let N > 0 be such that X ⊂ B(0, N) and
let r > 0 be such that B(0, r) ⊂ X. Since the function mapping a point x 6= 0 to the unique
intersection point of
Rx = {rx : r ∈ R}
and ∂B(0, N) is uniformly continuous on −B(0, r/2), it suffices to show that h is uniformly con-
tinuous on ∂B(0, N).
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Given δ > 0, set
θ = cos−1(1− (δ2/2N2))
β = cos−1(δ/2N), and
α = sin−1(r/N).
Define
ϕ(δ) =
δ|sin(β)|
|sin(α+ θ)| .
The function ϕ is constructed as a ‘worst case scenario’ given that X contains B(0, r) and is strictly
contained in B(0, N); see the following diagram.
b b
b
b
0
∂B(0, r)
∂B(0, N)
p
α
ϕ(δ)
δ
Fix a, b ∈ ∂B(0, N) with 0 < ‖a − b‖ < δ, and let x ∈ [0, a] ∩ X and y ∈ [0, b] ∩ X such that
‖x− y‖ > ϕ(δ); without loss of generality, ‖x‖ < ‖y‖. It suffices to show that it cannot occur that
both x, y ∈ ∂X, for then the assumption that ‖h(x) − h(y)‖ > ϕ(δ) leads to a contradiction. By
the construction of ϕ, the unique line passing through x and y must intersect B(0, r). It follows
that
x ∈ (conhull (B(0, r) ∪ {y}))◦ ⊂ X◦,
where conhull(S) is the convex hull of S. Hence if ‖a− b‖ < δ, then ‖h(a)− h(b)‖ 6 ϕ(δ).
It only remains to show that for each ε > 0 we can find a δ > 0 such that ϕ(δ) < ε. From elementary
calculations we have that
ϕ(δ) =
δ
√
4N2 − δ2
2r(1− (δ2/2N2)) + 2δ√(1− (r2/N2))(1− (δ2/2N2))
≤ δ
√
4N2 − δ2
2r(1− (r2/2N2)) + 2δ(1− (r2/N2)) −→ 0
as δ → 0. 
Lemma 7. Let X,Y be convex subsets of a normed space such that X,Y are both totally bounded,
and (X ∩ Y )◦ is inhabited. Then X ∩ Y is totally bounded.
Proof. Let ξ ∈ (X∩Y )◦ and let R > 0; without loss of generality ξ ∈ B(0, R). Let Y ′ = Y ∩B(0, R)
and let h be the uniformly continuous function which fixes X and maps each point y in −X to
the unique point in [ξ, z] ∩ ∂X. Fix ε > 0 and let δ ∈ (0, ε/4) be such that if ‖y − y′‖ < δ, then
‖h(y) − h(y′)‖ < ε/4. Let {y1, . . . , yk} be a δ/2-approximation of Y and partition {1, . . . , k} into
disjoint sets P,Q such that
i ∈ P ⇒ ρ(yi, X) < δ;
i ∈ Q ⇒ ρ(yi, X) > δ/2.
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If i ∈ P , then there exists x ∈ X such that ρ(x, yi) < δ. Then
‖yi − h(yi)‖ 6 ‖yi − xi‖+ ‖xi − h(yi)‖ < ε/4 + ε/4 = ε/2
and, since Y is convex, h(yi) ∈ X ∩ Y . The set
S = {h (yi) : i ∈ P}
is an ε-approximation of X ∩ Y ∩B(0, R) = X ∩ Y ′: fix z ∈ X ∩ Y and pick 1 6 i 6 k such that
‖z − yi‖ < δ/2.
Then i ∈ P , so h(yi) ∈ S and
‖z − h(yi)‖ 6 ‖z − yi‖+ ‖yi − h(yi)‖
< δ/2 + ε/2 < ε.

Lemma 8. P is compact and convex.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that P is closed and convex; it just remains to show that P is
totally bounded. By the bilinearity of the mapping (p,x) 7→ p · x, both Y pol and
{p ∈ RN : p · ξ = −1}
are locally totally bounded. Since P is the intersection of these two sets, P is locally totally bounded
by Lemma 7. It remains to show that P is bounded: by Lemma 4
M = sup{p · y : p ∈ Y pol, ‖p‖ = 1} < 0.
Suppose that there exists p ∈ P such that ‖p‖ > −1/M . Then p/‖p‖ ∈ Y pol and (p/‖p‖) · ξ =
−1/‖p‖ > M—a contradiction. 
Lemma 9. For each y ∈ Y and each r > 0 there exists p ∈ P such that p · y > −r.
Proof. Fix y ∈ ∂Y . Suppose that
sup{p · y : p ∈ P} < 0;
this supremum exists since P is totally bounded and (p,x) 7→ p · x is uniformly continuous. Then
there exists z ∈ −Y such that p · z < 0 for all p ∈ P . But
z ∈ P pol = (Y pol)pol = Y.
This contradiction ensures that sup{p · y : p ∈ P} = 0, from which the result follows. 
For the proof of Theorem 2, we need a constructive version of Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
Since Kakutani’s fixed point theorem is a generalisation of Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, it is not
valid in constructive mathematics. Before introducing the constructively valid form of Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem we shall use, we require several definitions. We use P∗(X) to denote the class
of nonempty located subsets of a set X. A set valued mapping on X is a function from X into
P∗(X); the graph of a set valued mapping Φ from X into Y is the subset
G(Φ) =
⋃
x∈X
{x} × Φ(x)
of X × Y . A set valued mapping Φ on a metric space X is said to be weakly approximable if
for each ε > 0, there exists
I a positive real number δ,
I a δ/2-approximation S of X, and
I a function Φ′ from S into P∗(X) with G(Φ′) ⊂ G(Φ),
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such that if x, x′ ∈ S, ‖x− x′‖ < δ, u ∈ Φ′(x), u′ ∈ Φ′(x′), and t ∈ [0, 1], then
ρ ((zt, ut) , G(Φ)) < ε,
where zt = ty + (1− t)y′ and ut = tu+ (1− t)u′. If Φ′ can be chosen independently of ε, in which
case S is a dense subset of X, then Φ is said to be weakly approximable with respect to Φ′.
The following is Theorem 10 of [11].
Theorem 10. Let X be a compact convex subset of RN and let {Φr : r ∈ R+} be a family of set
valued mappings on X such that
(i) for all r, r′ ∈ R, if r < r′, then there exists δ > 0 such that{
x ∈ RN : ∃z∈G(Φr)ρ(x, z) < δ
} ⊂ G (Φr′) ;
(ii) Φr is weakly approximable for each r ∈ R+.
Then for each r ∈ R+, there exists x ∈ X such that x ∈ Φr(x).
The proof of the following simple lemma is left to the reader.
Lemma 11. The composition of a weakly approximable mapping with a uniformly continuous
function is weakly approximable.
Lemma 12. For a fixed r > 0 and for each z ∈ ∂Y , define
gr(z) = {p ∈ P : p · z > −r} .
Then gr(z) is inhabited and located for each r > 0, and gr is weakly approximable.
Proof. That gr(z) is inhabited for each z follows from Lemma 9. Fix ε > 0 and let δ > 0 be such
that for all z, z′ ∈ RN , if ‖z−z′‖ < δ, then ‖p ·z−p ·z′‖ < r/2 for all p ∈ P—such a δ exists since
the mapping (p,x) 7→ p · x is uniformly continuous and P is totally bounded. Let z, z′ ∈ RN be
such that ‖z−z′‖ < δ and let p ∈ gr/2(z) and p′ ∈ gr/2(z′). For each t ∈ [0, 1], let pt = tp+(1−t)p′
and zt = tz+ (1− t)z′. Then for all t ∈ [0, 1] we have
pt · zt = (tp+ (1− t)p′) · (tz+ (1− t)z′)
= t2p · z+ t(1− t)(p · z′ + p′ · z) + (1− t)2p′ · z′
> −t2r/2− 2t(1− t)r − (1− t)2r/2 = −r.
Hence gr is weakly approximable with respect to gr/2. That gr(z) is located for each z ∈ ∂Y follows
from Theorem (4.9) on page 98 of [2], and the uniform continuity of the mapping p 7→ p · y on
P . 
We now have the proof of Theorem 2:
Proof. Let Fi be the demand function for the ith consumer and let
F =
m∑
i=1
Fi.
Fix ε > 0 and let δ > 0 be such that for all p ∈ P , if ‖x− x′‖ < δ, then ‖p · x− p · x′‖ < ε/2. Set
m = min
{
ε
2
,
δ
sup
{∥∥ξ − η∥∥ : η ∈ F (P )}
}
.
For each r > 0, define a set valued mapping Φr on P by
Φr = gr ◦ h ◦ F,
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where h, gr are as in Lemma 6 (for X =
∑m
i=1Xi) and Lemma 12 respectively; Φr is well defined
by Lemma 5. By Lemmas 6,8,11,12 and Theorem 1, Φr is approximable for each r > 0 and P is
compact and convex. Using Theorem 10, construct p ∈ P such that
p ∈ gm ◦ h ◦ F (p).
Set ξi = Fi(p) for each i, and set η = F (p). Then, by definition, the ξi satisfy condition E1, and
η satisfies E3. Pick t ∈ [0, 1) such that
ζ ≡ h(F (p)) = tξ + (1− t)η.
Since p ∈ gm(ζ) and η ∈ Y ,
−m < p · ζ = tp · ξ + (1− t)p · η 6 −t,
so t < m; whence ‖ζ − η‖ < δ. By our choice of δ, it follows that ‖p · η − p · ζ‖ < ε/2. Thus
p · η > −ε, so AE is satisfied. 
With the help of weak Ko¨nig’s lemma
WKL Every infinite binary tree has an infinite path.
we can recover the existence of an exact competitive equilibrium in the conclusion of Theorem 2:
repeatedly apply Theorem 2 to construct sequences (pn)n>1 , (ξ1,n)n>1 , . . . , (ξm,n)n>1 , (ηn)n>1 in
RN such that pn, ξ1,n, · · · , ξm,n, ηn satisfy E1,E3 and pn · ηn > −1/n for each n. With m + 2
applications of WKL we can construct an increasing sequence (kn)n>1 and points p, ξ1, · · · , ξm, η ∈
RN such that pn → p, ξi,n → ξi (1 6 i 6 m), and ηn → η as n→∞. The continuity of the demand
functions, the dot product, and summation ensure that p, ξ1, · · · , ξm, η ∈ RN is a competitive
equilibrium.
Since Theorem 2 allows for companies to make a loss (which can be made arbitrarily small), it is
of interest to see how the results of this paper change if the producers profits are shared by the
consumers. One should note that since rational entities will act continuously with respect to their
profits, any change in consumer behaviour, resulting from companies being able to make a loss, can
also be made arbitrary small. We leave a rigorous treatment of this set-up as an open problem.
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